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ARGUMENT 
I. Determinations of Disputed Materia. ;es ...: Fa^L aid 
Improper in a Summary Judgment Pro*. ..g, So Appellant ^s 
Not Required to Marshal the Evidence ^n Support :f the 
Di sr>11t e*rl Tnnrr>per Findings ^ f "^ a cf 
.: ..-o important to note that this case was disposed of by 
the trial court in a summary judgment proceeding. "On a motion 
for si immar \ ji; i igment, a t:i :i a 1 i i : t: weigh disputed 
evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues 
of fact exis' Draper City v. Estate of Fannie Bernardo, 888 
1
 J
 " III 9 95) ' [I] t: : i :i ] "} !::•= .] ;: = = : •: :L E , s\ , :)j : i: i 
statement uiia^ _.d* ::o dispute the averments on the ..other side 
of :he controversy <tnd create an issue of fact. . . . ''Summary 
* * i'r.:---r* ,.- . gener a] 1 y consi dered a di asti c i e • ' ai id 
is appropriate oni:. r^ien the facts are clear and undisputed." 
Id. a: 11C1 (quoting Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181
 vJtah 
1 -
In Draper City, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment because there were confli cting 
swor:. .--:-- •-  •: . . ; *-. ilH.d iosi.it'. ''I !iiial["jridl idcL L lid L had Lo 
be resolved at trial. Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1101. Similarly, 
the Affidavit of Linda Majors herein creates issues of material 
fact regard i.nq I li»' i »'presented: 11 it; nudf IM I ' d dl i i iiuni'i ind 
the circumstances surrounding her execution of the subject 
purchase agreement. 
I 
disputed issues of material fact in a summary judgment 
proceeding. Therefore, in order for an appellant to challenge 
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such an improper resolution of factual issues on appeal, it is 
not necessary for the appellant to marshal all of the evidence in 
support of a trial court's improper findings of fact. 
Plaintiff misstates the law on this point. Plaintiff's 
argument regarding the marshaling of evidence applies only when 
findings of fact have been made by a judge or a jury after a 
trial has been conducted. Both of the cases cited by Plaintiff 
on this point address findings of fact made after trial. See 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991); Ohline Corp. v. 
Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
II. Material Issues of Fact Preclude the Grant of Summary 
Judgment Herein. 
In summary judgment proceedings, "[d]oubts, uncertainties or 
inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment", Defendant 
herein. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, 
Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) . 
"Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court 
before judgment can be rendered against them . . . . The trial 
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility." Id. at 
1261. "[S]ummary judgment may be inappropriate even if the 
defendant fails to properly respond to the motion." TS 1 
Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In Mountain States Telephone, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment even though no 
affidavits were filed in opposition thereto. The Utah Supreme 
Court explained that the content of the findings of fact made by 
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the trial judge evidenced the existence of material issues of 
fact precluding the grant of summary judgment. Mountain States 
Telephone, 681 P.2d at 1261. 
Similarly, the contents of the findings of fact (both oral 
and written) made herein by Judge Brian evidence the existence of 
material issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Examples of 
Judge Brian's improper resolution of material factual issues were 
given in Appellant's Brief at pp. 10-12. Additionally, unlike 
Mountain States Telephone, an opposing affidavit was actually 
filed which specifically created material issues of fact 
regarding the fraudulent representations made to Defendant to 
induce her to execute the purchase agreement. 
When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Defendant, reasonable minds could differ as to whether Defendant 
was fraudulently induced to execute the purchase agreement. 
Reasonable minds could also differ as to whether all of the 
necessary elements of equitable estoppel are present. Therefore, 
the grant of summary judgment ordering specific performance of 
the purchase contract was improper. See, e.g., Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smiths Food & Drug Ctrs. , Inc., 889 P.2d 
44 5, 44 9-54 (Utah Ct. App. 19 94) (summary judgment properly 
denied because reasonable minds could differ based on evidence in 
the record). 
A. Order of specific performance of purchase agreement is 
improper on summary judgment. 
The purchase agreement itself is not enforceable by 
Plaintiff if Defendant's execution thereof was obtained by fraud. 
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See, e.g.. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665-67 (Utah 
1985). Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, Union Bank is directly 
on point on this issue, and is controlling authority herein. The 
facts and issues in both Union Bank and the instant case are 
identical--a party is attempting to use a summary judgment 
proceeding to enforce a written contract and to exclude all 
evidence of fraud in the inducement regarding the execution of 
the written contract. 
The trial court's factual finding that Defendant is merely 
trying to avoid the purchase agreement due to "cold feet" [R. at 
159] completely ignores Defendant's right to elect to rescind the 
purchase agreement or to affirm it and recover damages. See, 
e.g., Perkins v. Coombs, 769 P.2d 269, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Fraud in the inducement was specifically raised by Defendant 
as an affirmative defense in her answer, and was also argued in 
detail in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
[R. at 154-60] . Defendant also brought a counterclaim seeking to 
quiet title, asserting misrepresentation and fraud (specifically 
electing to rescind), and for slander of title. Defendant's 
counterclaim was not specifically referenced in Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment, and the hearing thereon only 
addressed the fraud in the inducement argument in general. 
Nevertheless, the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
implicitly and necessarily constituted an adverse ruling on all 
of the causes of action in Defendant's counterclaim because the 
grant of summary judgment necessarily precludes the grant of any 
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relief on Defendant's counterclaim. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 
P.2d 1178, 1181-82 (Utah 1993). 
B. Summary judgment is also improper based on Plaintiffs 
estoppel theory. 
The factual basis necessary for establishing virtually every 
element of equitable estoppel is disputed herein, thereby 
precluding summary judgment. It is necessary for the trier of 
fact to make findings of fact regarding each and every element 
before judgment can be rendered on Plaintiff's equitable estoppel 
claim. 
1. no inconsistent statement, act, etc. 
There was no "statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by [Defendant] inconsistent with a claim later asserted." 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's communications with 
Park City Title January 3-5, 1996 indicated an intent to close, 
which is supposedly inconsistent with Defendant's later election 
to rescind. However, Defendant's actions have always been 
consistent with her legal right to elect at any time to either 
affirm the purchase agreement and recover damages or to rescind 
the purchase agreement. See Perkins, 769 P.2d at 271. 
As set forth in the Affidavit of Linda Majors, 1M 19-22, at 
p. 4 [R. at 134], when Defendant did not receive the purchase 
price in cash within forty-eight hours as agreed, she was forced 
to make other financial arrangements, she was no longer motivated 
to sell the subject condominium, and upon advice of counsel she 
dav c:\clients\ma30rs\reply.brf 
-5-
ultimately exercised her legal right to rescind the fraudulent 
transaction. 
Additionally, Defendant's courtesy in allowing Plaintiff to 
stay in the subject condominium for one night in no way binds 
Defendant as a matter of law to sell the subject condominium to 
Plaintiff. Mr. Knapp telephoned Defendant and explained that he 
was in Park City and could not find a place to stay. As 
Defendant's condominium was not being used that night, she 
graciously gave her consent for him to stay there overnight. It 
turns out that Plaintiff stayed nearly a week in Defendant's 
condominium, free of charge, without her knowledge or consent. 
2. no reasonable reliance 
Plaintiff did not take any action whatsoever in reasonable 
reliance upon the alleged inconsistent conduct of Defendant. See 
Travelers, 896 P.2d at 647. The only action allegedly taken by 
Plaintiff is his travel to Utah and tender of timely performance 
pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement. However, 
Plaintiff admits that he travelled to Utah and tendered timely 
performance on or before January 3, 1996. See Brief of Appellee, 
IV.C.l & 3, at p. 4. Plaintiff further admits that the alleged 
inconsistent conduct of Defendant did not occur until January 4-
5, 1996. See Brief of Appellee, IV.C.5-7, at pp. 5-6. 
Furthermore, it is apparent from the course of action taken by 
Plaintiff thus far that Plaintiff would have attempted to close 
on the purchase of the subject condominium even if Defendant had 
refused to let him stay in the subject condominium at that time. 
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Accordingly, Plaintiff did not take any action in reasonable 
reliance upon the alleged inconsistent conduct of Defendant. 
3. no injury 
Plaintiff has not established that he would be injured as a 
result of Defendant's alleged inconsistent conduct. See 
Travelers, 896 P.2d at 647. The injury Plaintiff claims to have 
suffered is actually the result of the fraudulent conduct of Mr. 
Knapp in inducing Defendant to execute the subject purchase 
agreement. Plaintiff is not entitled to compel specific 
performance of the subject purchase agreement and Plaintiff's 
injury is not properly attributable to Defendant's exercise of 
her legal right to rescind a fraudulent transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
There are numerous issues of material fact that preclude the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this matter. 
The trial court improperly resolved these factual disputes in a 
summary judgment proceeding and also improperly refused to even 
consider evidence of fraud in the inducement regarding 
Defendant's execution of the subject purchase agreement. 
Similar to the result in Union Bank, Defendant respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, and to remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 14th day of November, 1996. 
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